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QUANTITATIVE
INTERFERENCE WITH




Although the right to life is internationally recognized, the apparently
simple injunction not to kill is not easily interpreted. In this area, as
elsewhere, human law does not have to enforce the whole of morality:' non
omne quod licet honestum est. Legally, there exists a conflict between a
natural law approach, in which the right to life is recognized from the time
of conception, and a liberal and humanitarian approach involving, among
other things, utilitarian considerations.
After a brief survey of the ancient's views on abortion, this Article will
examine existing statutory provisions upon which the crime of abortion
rests in Ireland. It will next consider the rights, if any, accorded to the fetus
at law, and will then conclude with a discussion of the relevant constitu-
tional provisions-in particular, those providing the right to privacy and
the rights of a fetus, if any, under the Irish Constitution.
ANCIENT LEGAL CODES
For centuries, the practice of abortion, which occurred with varying
frequency in many countries, was condemned by clergy as well as lawyers.
The modern legislative trend toward condoning abortion is retrogressive,
for legalized abortion is completely opposed to ancient legal codes. The
Sumerian Code of 2000 B.C. is the oldest known code of laws to penalize a
citizen for having brought about an abortion.2 The Middle Assyrian Code
of 1500 B.C., which referred to the fetus as a human life,3 provided that a
woman proved to have "cast the fruit of her womb by her own act" should
suffer impalement.' Similarly, the Code of Hammurabi of 1800 B.C., the
* Assistant Lecturer in Law, University College, Dublin.
See G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 197 (1958).
2 See C. JOHNS, THE LAWS OF BABYLON AND LAWS OF THE HEBREW PEOPLE (1912).
See G. DRIVER & J. MILES, THE ASSYRIAN LAWS 107-08 (1935).
Section 53 of the Middle Assyrian Code made it an extremely serious crime for a woman to
procure or cause her own abortion. The savage punishment of impalement, imposed for only
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Hittite Code of 1300 B.C., and indirectly the Book of Exodus all contained
punishments for abortion.5
Prior to 1803, the law of England and Ireland only prohibited abor-
tions that occurred after the fetus had quickened or moved in the womb.,
This limitation on the prohibition against abortion was probably based
upon the ancient speculation as to the time when life commbnced. Aristo-
tle had estimated the time to be forty days after conception for males and
ninety days after conception for females.7 From the 14th century onward,
many theologians held that the abortion of a "non-souled" fetus was justi-
fied.' They believed that approximately forty days were required for a male
fetus to develop sufficiently to support a soul while approximately eighty
days were required for a female fetus to do the same.' Blackstone, the great
English jurist of the 18th century, believed that life began in law as soon
as the infant is able to stir in the mother's womb." Under these views, it
is hardly surprising that abortion before quickening only became a crime
in 1803, and even then was not punishable as severely as abortion after
quickening."
the most heinous crimes, was directed against those committing abortions. It was apparently
considered an affront against religion and the worst offense a mother could commit. Id. at
115-17. A penalty was also imposed for the destruction of an embryo as a result of an assault
upon a pregnant woman. Id. at 110-11.
* For the most part, these ancient laws directed their penalties against persons who commit-
ted assaults upon pregnant women. The punishments varied depending upon the class and/or
marital status of the victim. Apparently, only the Assyrian Code directly referred to what
we know of today as abortion. 1 G. DRovER & J. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 413-16 (1952).
See 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *50; I. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 31, § 16 (4th ed. 1962).
See ARISTOTLE, HIST. ANIM. 7.3.5836; GEN. ANIM. 2.3.736, 2.5.741.
See AUGUSTINE, DE ORIGINE ANIMAE 4.4.
Id.
10 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129. This concept of the recognition of life after quicken-
ing wasalso reflected in Blackstone's belief that a woman who was convicted of a capital
offense and sentenced to death should be able to gain a delay of execution by proving she
was pregnant. In such a case, twelve women would determine if the convict was quick with
child. If the woman was barely with child, however, no delay in execution based on pregnancy
would be allowed. 4 id. at *31.
" See Lord Ellenborough's Act, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, §§ 1-2. Section 1 provided capital
punishment for the abortion of a quick fetus, while section 2 provided lesser penalties for
abortion before quickening. Id. One of the key areas of disagreement in the debate concerning
abortion and its legality involves the point in time at which a fetus becomes a human being.
According to one commentator, the points in time which are most widely held to be the
beginning of human life include:
the moment of conception; the time (about the seventh or eighth day) at which seg-
mentation, if it is to take place, takes place; the time (about the end of the sixth week)
at which fetal brain activity commences; the moment (sometime between the thir-
teenth and twentieth week) of quickening, when the mother begins to feel the move-
ments of the fetus; the time (about the twenty-fourth week) at which the fetus becomes
viable, that is, has a reasonable chance of survival if born; and the moment of birth.
B. BRODY, ABORTION AND THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE: A PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW 80 (1975).
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PRESENT STATUTORY LAW
In Ireland, the offense of abortion is legally defined in the Offences
Against the Person Act, 2 which establishes a maximum punishment of
imprisonment for life whether abortion is attempted before or after quick-
ening.'" The statute covers two situations: (1) where a pregnant woman
uses any means with intent to procure her own miscarriage; 4 and (2) where
anyone else unlawfully uses means with such intent, whether the woman
is pregnant or not. 5 Instances of "means" given in the statute are "poison
or other noxious thing" or "any instrument."'"
A leading Irish case concerning an attempt to procure a poison or other
noxious thing is People v. Thornton. 17 The appellant was tried and acquit-
ted in the circuit court at Galway on charges of having unlawful carnal
knowledge of a domestic servant at his house on a number of occasions
when she was under the age of fifteen years.'" He was also charged with
unlawfully attempting to obtain ergot, knowing that it was intended to be
used unlawfully for the purpose of procuring a miscarriage for the girl."
With regard to the latter charge, the prosecution adduced evidence of a
conversation alleged to have taken place between the accused and a medi-
cal doctor who was treating the girl at the time. 0 The accused was alleged
to have asked the doctor "'wasn't there some drug named ergot?' -21 It
was held by Judge Haugh in the court of criminal appeal that the convic-
tion relating to attempt should be quashed. The judge viewed the evi-
dence as consistent with explanations which did not necessarily involve an
attempt by the accused to obtain ergot for the purposes alleged by the
prosecution." Judge Haugh also stated that where a charge is based on an
alleged attempt to commit a crime, the jury should be told by the trial
judge that neither mere desire to commit a crime nor such desire followed
by an intention to do so is sufficient to constitute an attempt.2 4
The offense of abortion is a crime. 25 Its existence on the statute books




" Id. Another section in the Offences Against the Person Act provides for the punishment of
"penal servitude" for those who supply or procure means to accomplish an abortion. Id. §
59.




2, Id. at 95.
2 Id. at 97.
" Id. at 96.
24 Id. at 93.
2" United Kingdom records show that the penalty imposed for illegal abortion is usually nine
months imprisonment. G. ABRAHAMS, MORALITY AND THE LAw 107 (1971). In the Irish case of
People v. Coleman, [1945] I.R. 237 (Crim. App. 1944), a circuit court conviction on two
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recognizes the value of human life from conception, but no rights result for
the unborn as a consequence. In other countries, it has been possible to
remove or alter criminal prohibitions against abortion without effecting a
violation of any rights.2 1 In many of these nations, legislation liberalizing
abortion law has frequently been justified under the heading of "social
policy.' '2
It is an offense to use instruments under the Offenses Against the
Person Act.28 Is it ever possible to lawfully use instruments; in other words,
is there any defense to the crime laid down in the Act? In The King v.
Bourne,21 a 1938 case which attracted considerable public attention at the
time, a defense was read into the statute in Britain. A girl of fourteen was
raped by a number of soldiers with great violence, and as a result of this
assault became pregnant .3 Dr. Aleck Bourne, the defendant, was a leading
obstetric surgeon and gynecologist who performed the abortion with the
consent of the girl's parents.3 1 After a careful examination of the girl, he
concluded that it was his duty to perform the operation since, in his opin-
ion, continuance of the pregnancy would probably cause her serious in-
jury.3 ' The court held that if the operation was done in good faith for the
purpose of preserving the life of the potential mother it was lawful. 3 Al-
though there may be no difference between saving and preserving a
mother's life, the latter is arguably wider. It is likely that the surgeon need
not expect a mother's life to be curtailed during the period of gestation or
in delivery for abortion to be legal. It also appears that the mother need
not be in imminent peril of death; it is enough if the doctor anticipates that
counts of criminal abortion was reversed. It is interesting to note that the sentence imposed
by the lower court was fifteen years of penal servitude on each count, the sentences to run
concurrently, id. at 243-44, despite the fact that under the Offences Against the Person Act,
1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, § 58, an offender was subject to penal servitude for life.
26 In the United States, for example, laws restricting abortion were struck down because they
infringed upon the constitutionally protected right of privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973).
See Tietze, Incident of Legal Abortion, in A. OMRAN, LmEALIZATION OF ABORTION LAws:
IMPLICATIONS 1-7 (1976).
28 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
[1939] 1 K.B. 687 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1938).
20 Id. at 688.
31 Id. at 690.
32 Id. at 688. Dr. Bourne testified during the trial that it was the psychological injury about
which he was concerned. Moreover, he would not have performed the operation if the girl had
venereal disease, for fear that his action would spread it, or if the girl was feebleminded or of
a "prostitute mind." Id. at 694-95.
Id. at 691. Judge Macnaghten compared the statute in question to the Infant Life (Preser-
vation) Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34, under which anyone who wilfully caused an infant
to die was guilty of a felony, but no person could be found guilty unless it was proven that
he acted without good faith for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother. Judge
Macnaghten considered the "good faith" provision and concluded that although no such
provision appears in the Offences Against the Persons Act, the section outlawing the use of
an instrument with intent to procure a miscarriage should be read as if it were qualified by a
similar provision. [1939] 1 K.B. at 691.
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the child cannot be delivered without the mother's death. 4
In view of this acceptance of therapeutic abortion in Britain, the
Bourne defense of necessity could, in appropriate circumstances, be read
into the statutory provision in force in Ireland. This is significant since
utterances in favor of therapeutic abortion have already been made in the
Irish Senate. 3 Although it was not clear at the time of Bourne whether
more could be read into the defense of necessity, this doubt was eventually
resolved in Newton v. Stungo.0 There, Judge Ashworth, in his directions
to the jury, after stating that "use of an instrument is unlawful unless the
use is made in good faith for the purpose of preserving the life or health of
the woman," added that this included mental as well as physical health."
The criterion of necessity applied by the courts is subjective; the ques-
tion is not whether the operation is in fact necessary to preserve the life of
the mother, but whether the defendant believes it to be necessary. This
belief does not have to be based on reasonable grounds. It is enough if the
doctor acts with an honest belief. In determining this, the court will con-
sider the size of the medical fee; if large, this suggests mala fides.38 The
court will also consider whether the defendant followed accepted medical
practice .
Because of the uncertainty in Britain after the aforementioned cases,
pressure grew for a precise indication as to the circumstances in which
abortion was legally permissible. The result was the passage in 1967 of
the British Abortion Act." Under the Act, an abortion may be performed
up to the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy if two medical practitioners
certify in good faith
(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of
the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the
pregnancy were terminated; or (b) that there is a substantial risk that if the
child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities
as to be seriously handicapped.2
The Committee on the Working of the Abortion Act was set up in 1971
under Mrs. Justice Lane to examine alleged abuses under the Act.43 It
", Id. at 692-93.
' SENATE DEBATES, c. 560 (Dec. 19, 1973); SENATE DEBATES, cc. 353 & 356 (Feb. 21, 1974).
s' 1958 CRIM. L. REv. 469 (Cent. Crim. Ct. May 19, 1958).
7 Id. Newton is discussed in Harvard, Therapeutic Abortion, 1958 CRIM. L. REv. 600, 605
(1958).
3 Harvard, Therapeutic Abortion, 1958 CRIM. L. REv. 600, 608 (1958).
5' Id. at 613.
40 1 BRrrISH MED. J. 182 (1967).
, Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87.
42 Id. § 1(1). The Act also permits the doctor to consider the pregnant woman's "actual or
reasonably foreseeable environment." Id. § 1(2). For a discussion of the "logical oddities" of
the Act, see Crawford, Abortion: A Logical Oddity, 126 NEW L.J., 252 (1976).
"3 The committee was directed to "review the operation of the Abortion Act of 1967." Sir
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recommended a reduction of the period within which abortion could be
performed from twenty-eight to twenty-four weeks44 because of the chances
of survival of a fetus outside the womb at that age. 5 According to the
findings of the committee, the number of abortions granted on the ground
of risk to the life of the pregnant woman was very small; two percent for
1971.46 The highest percentage of abortions, 76.4 percent in 1971, were
carried out on the grounds of risk of injury to the mental or physical health
of the mother. 7 The next largest category, 3.3 percent in 1971, related to
risk to the physical or mental health of existing children.48
It appears that most Irish women who seek abortions in Britain do so
on the grounds of risk to their own physical or mental health."9 Therefore,
a defense of necessity restricted to threat to the life of the mother would
be of little practical consequence in Ireland. It is a well known fact, how-
ever, that the British Abortion Act is of considerable practical consequence
in Ireland.5"
About fifteen years ago abortion was an emotive word in Britain. It is
far less so today. One fact that is becoming obscured about the 1967 Act
is that it does not permit the wanton killing of unborn babies. Paradoxi-
cally, the Act has as its root a respect for human life. From the purely legal
point of view, as the text of the Act and its long title5 make clear, it is a
law which protects medical practitioners from criminal prosecution when
they perform an abortion in certain stated circumstances. The right to
abortion given under the Act is not a legal right, strictu sensu. The Act
says that a pregnant woman can, if she follows the proper procedure laid
Keith Joseph, Secretary of State for Social Services, stated in answer to a Parliamentary
Question on Feb. 23, 1971:
The Enquiry will be concerned with the way the Act is working and not with the
principles that underlie it. It will be open to the Committee not only to recommend
changes in the law but also to suggest interim changes in the Regulations under the
present Act should they find this necessary.
1 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE WORKING OF THE ABORTION AcTr A, 1, at 1 (1974).
" Id. § R, 520, at 171.
,5 Id. § J, 279, at 90.
, 2 id. ch. 4, 113-14, at 54-55. A relatively small number of abortions in England are
performed on the basis of potential physical or mental abnormalities of an unborn
child-1.1%. A negligible number of abortions (24 out of a total of 126,777 in 1971) were
performed in emergency situations to save a pregnant woman's life or to prevent her from
suffering grave physical injury. It is interesting to note the enormous increase in the total
number of abortions performed in Great Britain since the inception of the Abortion Act.




41 Id. ch. 8C, 361(d), at 208.
' A total of 578 abortions were performed on Irish women in Great Britain in 1971. Id. 355,
at 204.
" The full title of the Abortion Act is: "An Act to amend and clarify the law relating to the
termination of pregnancy by registered medical practitioners." Abortion Act, 1967, c.87, § 1.
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down by the Act, alter her and her surgeon's existing legal duty not to
perform an abortion upon her, so that the surgeon will acquire a duty to
perform the abortion or to request some other surgeon to perform it if the
woman asks him to do so.51 Her request, in other words, becomes legally
permissible. In the Hohfeldian sense, she is given a power to alter her own
and her surgeon's existing duties." It is clear, however, that the Act does
not give ethical approval to abortion."
RIGHTS OF THE FETUS AT LAW
Pro-abortionists dislike the use of the phrase "unborn child." They are
forced to work out a philosophy denigratory of the fetus in order to support
their thesis. Yet, the very question whether one can deprive the nasciturus
of life seems strangely ill put in light of the present trend towards develop-
ment of more protective rights for the unborn.
In a 1968 French case, s5 Mme. Saulze, having contracted German
measles in the course of her duties as a schoolteacher, gave birth to a child
suffering from serious disabilities." She received damages for herself and
her child on the grounds that a child who has been conceived must be
recognized as a person entitled to the benefit of the principle of state
responsibility. 5
German developments are even more significant. Torts against the
unborn were originally regarded as conceptually impossible in Germany.
Today, however, section 823(1) of the German Civil Code embodies the
principle that "whoever intentionally or negligently causes unlawful dam-
age to life, body, health, property or any other right of another person, is
11 The proper procedure for determining whether an abortion may be legally performed re-
quires that two registered medical practitioners certify that the continuation of the pregnancy
involves a greater risk to the life of the woman, or of injury to the mental or physical health
of the woman, or to any existing children in her family than if the pregnancy was terminated;
or that there is substantial risk that the child will be born with a handicap. In addition, the
termination must be carried out in a certified hospital. If, however, there is immediate risk
perceived by the physician, these requirements need not be complied with. See Abortion Act,
1967, c. 87, § 1.
According to Hohfeld, a duty is a correlative of a right. If, between two people, one has a
right enforceable against the other, the latter has a duty toward the former. See W. HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEP'nONS (Cook ed. 1923). Before the Abortion Act, neither the sur-
geon nor the mother had a right to an abortion-both had duties not to perform one. Under
the new law, however, the woman by request and the doctor by certification can change the
preexisting duty.
14 See G. ABRAHAMS, MoRALITY AND THE LAW 29 (1971). Abrahams suggests that simply be-
cause the law has been passed does not, without more, signify society's ethical approval. The
legislature is not necessarily voicing a moral or religious judgment, for the law can be regarded
as public health legislation. Id.
" Minister of Nat'l Educ. v. Saulze, (Conseil d'Etat, Nov. 6,1968), discussed in Weeraman-
try, Judicial Application of the Rule of Law, REvIEw OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF
JuiusTs 43 (1969).
"Id. at 44.
" Id. at 44-45.
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liable to make good the resulting damage."58 It is quite clear from case law
that "person" covers unborn persons. In 1949, the Supreme Court of
Schleswig-Holstein awarded damages to a child born with venereal disease
which had been transmitted from the mother. The father was held liable
to pay damages for negligence causing injury to health. Similarly, in 1952,
a woman contracted venereal disease in the course of a blood transfusion
and transmitted the disease to her subsequently conceived child." She was
given a remedy by the German Federal Court against the hospital adminis-
tration under section 823(1).'" In 1972, the same court, pursuant to the
same statute, awarded damages to a spastic child for injuries sustained
while en ventre sa mere as a result of a road traffic accident."'
In Poland, the Supreme Court in 1965 had to consider whether a child
injured in the course of an unsuccessful abortion was entitled to a remedy
against the hospital." It is somewhat horrifying that a case like this could
arise at all. The Court decided for the plaintiff-child, holding that he was
"entitled to compensation for injuries sustained whilst in the womb of the
mother in spite of the fact that the act which caused the injuries was
committed before birth and was directed against the mother." 3
The examples cited are taken from civil law countries. Common law
countries have similar decisions. In South Africa, for example, a case arose
in 1963 concerning a child born with cerebral palsy." Although a causal
connection between the accident and the injuries alleged to have resulted
therefrom was not established, 5 it was stated that if this were established
in an appropriate case, damages could be awarded for injury to an unborn
child."
In 1972, an unborn person was held to come within "the neighbor
principle" in Watt v. Roma,6" an Australian case involving a traffic acci-
dent. There is no reason why an Irish court might not apply this reasoning.
In Britain, over thirty-five years ago, a pregnant woman was injured when
a ladder left up against a cinema fell upon her. 6 As a result of the accident,
the child was born prematurely the following day" and died within twenty-
German Civil Code, Book 2, tit. 25, § 823(1) (Forrester, Goren & Ilgen trans. 1975).
" Decision of Dec. 20, 1952, 8 BGHZ 243.
'Id.
61 Decision of Jan. 11, 1972, quoted in 27 JURiSTENZEIrUNG 363 (1972).
's Decision of Jan. 8, 1965, noted in 10 PANSTWO I PRAWO 151 (1968).
,3 Id.
1, Pinchin N.O. v. Santam Ins. Co., 1963 (2) S.A. 254 (W), noted in Meyer, A Delictual
Remedy for the Unborn Child, 80 S. AFR. LEGAL J. 447 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Meyer].
aS Meyer, supra note 64, at 448.
"Id. (dicta).
7 [1972] V.R. 353 (Vic. Sup. Ct.). The "neighbor principle," developed in Donoghue v.
Stevenson, [19321 A.C. 562, provides that the moral duty to love your neighbor becomes in
law a duty not to injure your neighbor. The Donoghue court, in applying this rule, equated
"neighbors" with reasonably foreseeable third parties. Id. at 580.
11 See 83 SOL. J. 185 (1939).
Is Id.
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four hours.7" The suit brought by the mother against the cinema owners
was settled out of court.7' Counsel for the woman remarked to the judge
at Liverpool Assizes that "in many ways it is to be regretted that your
lordship has not been called upon to decide an interesting question of
law." The judge replied, "I cannot say that it is a regret which I person-
ally share. 7 3 Many have since disagreed with that judge.
The thalidomide situation presented several problems for the legal
system in Britain. Motivated largely by this, the Law Reform Commission
in August 1974 produced a Report on Injuries to Unborn Children7' con-
taining proposed legislation. It is highly significant that the legislation
strives to eliminate all doubt as to whether an unborn child has rights."
Recovery is contingent on live birth and remedies are envisaged even for
preconception injuries. 0 Thus, it appears that if a man suffering from
syphilis has intercourse with a woman without telling her that he is in-
fected, a child resulting therefrom would have a cause of action: Vox populi
suprema lex. In common law theory, on the other hand, remedies for pre-
conception injuries provide difficulties.
Finally, one may glance at American law. In Zepeda v. Zepeda,77 the
plaintiff sued his natural father for the stigma of bastardy resulting from
the denial of the plaintiff's "right" to be legitimate. Counsel for the plain-
tiff sought to rely on a tort of "wrongful life. '78 The Illinois appellate court
held that the plaintiff possessed a right, but could have no remedy, a case
of damnu absque injuria.7 ' The court recognized that factors such as men-
70 Id.
71 A report of the settlement between the injured woman and the cinema which appeared in
the Solicitors' Journal, id., expressed considerable confusion about the rights of the unborn
in tort law due to the "very meagre supply of case law." It referred to the leading Irish case
of Walker v. Great N. Ry., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (1891), which held that no such action could be
maintained for prenatal injuries. Two of the four judges in Walker, however, had decided the
case on the ground that no duty of care was owed to the fetus because the tortfeasors were
unaware of its existence.
The report also discussed the status of the unborn in other areas of the law. In the
criminal area, a defendant may be liable for murder when injuries inflicted before birth result
in death after birth, The King v. West, 2 C & K. 784, and it is incitement to murder to
convince a pregnant woman to murder her child after it is born, The King v. Shepherd,
[1912] 2 K.B. 125.
The report suggested legislative reform prior to creation of a tort rule under which the
injury would be concealed "in a state of suspended animation for a period of two or three
months." This concern was expressed because of the uncertainty concerning whether or not
the victim would be born alive and, therefore, would be a proper complainant in a tort action.
If the fetus were to die unborn the civil action would die with it. 83 SOL. J. at 185.
72 83 SOL. J. at 185.
73 Id.
1, LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON INJURIES TO UNBORN CHILDREN (1974).
75 Id.
76 Id.
1 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1965).
11 41 Ill. App. 2d at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
" Id. at 257-62, 190 N.E.2d at 857-59. The court recognized that a wrong had been committed,
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tal anguish and economic disadvantage attach to illegitimates, but could
not justify a monetary recovery absent legislation allowing such recovery."
There is surely an irony here in the law. The factors referred to, mental
anguish and the like, are the very ones which are determinative under the
law of most countries of whether the essence of life can be destroyed. And
there the anguish, the disadvantage, or whatever, inhere in someone other
than the person whose life may be destroyed.
Later cases in the United States have tried to establish an actionable
tort along the lines urged in Zepeda. Most have been unsuccessful. A child
of a mentally deficient woman raped in a mental institution was held not
entitled to sue the state of New York for negligence contributing to the
occurrence of the rape and the resultant stigma of illegitimacy which at-
tached to the plaintiff."' In Florida, a child born illegitimately was not
allowed to sue for "wrongful life." 2 Nonetheless, many writers now favor
the recognition of a tort of wrongful life.
In Ireland, the matter of civil remedies for the unborn is settled by
statute. Section 58 of the Civil Liability Act enables a child injured before
birth to sue for damages suffered as a result of the injury: "For the avoid-
ance of doubt it is hereby declared that the law relating to wrongs shall
apply to an unborn child for his protection in like manner as if the child
were born provided the child is subsequently born alive."'" Thus, an un-
born child in Ireland is clearly a persona juridica.
but was reluctant to open the doors to a wide variety of suits of a similar nature:
It is not the suits of illegitimates which give us concern, great in numbers as these may
be. What does disturb us is the nature of the new action and the related suits which
would be encouraged. Encouragement would extend to all others born into the world
under conditions they might regard as adverse. One might seek damages for being born
of a certain color, another because of race; one for being born with a hereditary disease,
another for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics; one for being born into a
large and destitute family, another because a parent has an unsavory reputation.
Id. at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
" Id. at 262, 190 N.E.2d at 859. The Zepeda court believed that the logical consequences of
allowing recovery in such a case would be inconsistent with public policy. The court stated
that any such radical change should come from the legislature. Id.
SI Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966). The Williams
court sustained the dismissal of the action for failure to state a cause of action. Id. at 483-84,
223 N.E.2d at 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
92 Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1967). Although Pinkney was later overruled in
Brown v. Bray, 300 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1974), the Florida Supreme Court's rationale in Brown
did not disturb that part of the Pinkney holding concerning the dismissal of the daughter's
action for wrongful life. Id. at 669.
9 See, e.g., 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 212 (1966) (action should be limited to nonconsensual inter-
course); 40 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 116 (1965) (suggesting creation of an administrative agency to
handle "wrongful life" claims). See generally Note, The Infliction of Illegitimacy-A New
Tort? 43 N.D.L. REv. 99 (1966).
11 Civil Liability Act, 1963, § 58. It is significant that the section begins this way. It does so
because of the decision in Walker v. Great N. Ry., 28 L. R. Ir. 69 (1891), in which damages
were denied in respect to a child en ventre sa mkre partly on the basis that the railway
company owed no duty of care to an unborn child.
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The right to life is more fundamental than any other of the civil rights.
It is strange that civil rights in general are expanding while the right to
life in the theory of the law becomes less valuable. It is difficult to sustain
an argument which denies the status of life at law to the fetus or which
holds that, for policy reasons, life may be taken away-whether at the
beginning or indeed the end of life.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
In Ireland, the Constitution of 1937 adds a further dimension to the
legal issue of abortion. In other countries with a written code of laws, it
has been urged that a woman has a fundamental right of privacy with
regard to her own person and therefore no law can validly effect a blanket
ban on abortion as this constitutes a violation of privacy., The right to
privacy is increasing in importance. It has been recognized in a particular
sense in Ireland in McGee v. Attorney General,8 wherein the Supreme
Court indicated that a husband and wife have a right to marital privacy. 7
The European Convention
Ireland has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms,88 article 2(1) of which declares that
"[elveryone's right to life shall be protected by law."8 In the early 1960s,
the European Commission on Human Rights at Strasbourg passed upon
an application from Norway regarding abortion legislation and article 2.11
The petition was brought in an effort to have a domestic Norwegian law
permitting abortion in specific circumstances declared contrary to article
2.11 The applicant asked the commission to decide, first, whether the "right
to beget offspring is an inalienable human right or if not, under what
conditions and circumstances this right might be forfeited;""2 and sec-
ondly, "whether human rights are fully applicable to the human embryo
from the time of conception, or if not, at what stages in the development
of the human individual these rights take part and full force." '83 The com-
5 Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). There, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the right to privacy is fundamental, and cannot be infringed upon by legislation absent
a "compelling state interest." Id. at 152-56.
", [1974] I.R. 284 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
' Id. at 336 (Griffen, J., concurring).
sSee CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS,
reprinted in J. FAWCETr, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(1969) [hereinafter cited as CONVENTION]. Ireland signed the Convention on April 29, 1967
in Strasbourg, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COLLECTED TEXTS 811 (10th ed.
1975).
" CONVENTION, supra note 88, art. 2, § 1.
"Application 867/60, X v. Norway, [1961] Y.B. Eua. CON. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 270.
Id. at 274.
3 Id. at 270-72.
" Id. at 272.
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mission held that it was not possible to proceed with the application since
article 25 of the Convention requires that an individual applicant must
also be a victim of an alleged violation of human rights.9 In later cases,
however, the commission was prepared, if necessary, to consider whether
an applicant was indirectly a victim of an alleged violation. 5 Thus, the
commission accepted that a woman might indirectly be a victim where her
complaint related to the conviction and sentence of her minor son." It also
accepted that a woman might indirectly be a victim where her husband
was detained in a mental institution. 7 The commission considered itself
competent to examine the complaints of these persons, but only to the
extent that the matter complained of might have affected their own rights
under the Convention. This interpretation of article 25 is not likely to be
determinative in a case such as the Norwegian one, as it is doubtful
whether the rights under the Convention of a morally interested appli-
cant-e.g., a father-would be affected by abortion.
In any case, the general "human rights approach" to abortion was
summed up in mid-1974 by the research director of the National Center
of Scientific Research in Strasbourg:
Abortion is not to be seen as a comparison between the value of two lives.
[One is perhaps entitled to interpose that very often it is not looked upon as
such a choice at all. The value in terms of self to the woman is placed against
the essence, the very right to life, of another person as yet unborn. Without
protection of the essence, one might say one cannot talk about the value of
life.] Rather it is the recognition of a certain rationality in the exercise of
the potential right to life which a human being has from conception ... legal
procedures should ensure that decisions taken in this matter will always be
taken from the perspective of the interests of the unborn."
" Id. at 276. Article 25 provides:
The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organization or group of indi-
viduals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the high contracting Parties
of the rights set forth in the Convention ....
CONVENTION, supra note 88, art. 25. There is no limitation regarding an applicant's national-
ity. Any person, whether he is a resident of the signatory state or not, can lodge a petition
with the commission, claiming to be a victim of a violation that occurred within the jurisdic-
tion of the state held responsible. J. FAwcTrr, THE APPLICATION OF THE EURoPEAN CONVENTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 279 (1969).
" See, e.g., Application 100/55, X v. Federal Republic of Germany, [1956] Y.B. EUa. CONY.
.ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1962; Application 1478/62, Koolen v. Belgium, 13 EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
COLLECTION OF DECISIONS 55, 87.
" Application 4007/69, X v. Federal Republic of Germany (unpublished), discussed in
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, BRINGING AN
APPLICATION BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 5.
"7 Application 4185/69, X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 35 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COLLEC-
TION OF DECISIONS 140.
" Address by A. Kiss, National Center of Scientific Research, Strasbourg, 1974.
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Other Countries
In West Germany, an abortion law was rejected recently in a specifi-
cally constitutional context. Section 218A of the Fifth Statute for the Re-
form of the Penal Law, which permitted abortion on demand in the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy, was rejected by the Federal Constitutional
Court of West Germany in February 1975 on the basis that abortion is "an
action designed to destroy life."99 The court held that the protection pro-
vided the right to life by the German Constitution must also apply to the
unborn child.9 0 Thus, abortion, except in certain defined circumstances,
is still criminal in that country.
Another case considering the constitutional dimensions of abortion
was adjudicated in Italy a week prior to the Germany decision. In form,
this case is most likely to resemble a case brought under the Irish Constitu-
tion, since the Italian Constitutional Court was forced to consider the
constitutional validity of a blanket ban on abortion. The court recognized
the possibility of conflict between the constitutional rights of the fetus and
those of the mother, and held that, where such conflict occurs, the mother's
right to health and sanity must prevail over any rights of the embryo which
is "not yet a person."'' The threat to physical or psychic health was held
to be a ground capable of justifying abortion. The court also invited the
legislature to draft new legislation.' 2 Later, the court ruled that it had no
objections to a national referendum on abortion.
In the United States the Supreme Court struck down restrictive state
abortion laws in 1973. Since then, there has been an increase of over fifty
percent in the number of legal abortions."3 The Court held that abortions
are legal before a fetus becomes "viable," but declined to say specifically
when this occurs:
We need not resolve this difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy and theology are
unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary ... is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer.'
Ireland
Respect for the right to life is enshrined in the Irish Constitution05
along with other rights such as property rights'00 and the right to a good
1 Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE.
100 Id.
I Decision of Feb. 19, 1975 (Constitutional Court of Italy).
102 Id.
"0 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 159.
" The Irish constitution provides: "The State shall ... by its laws protect as best it may
from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name,
and property rights of every citizen." IRE. CONST. art. 40, § 3.
"0' Id.
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name.' 7 There is no indication that this right is extended to unborn per-
sons. In fact, all constitutional rights are guaranteed to "citizens,"'' 8 with
the exception of the habeas corpus provisions which apply to "persons."'",
Two passages in recent Irish case law tend to be relied on to support
the contention that legislation permitting abortion could not be introduced
in Ireland under its constitution. The first is in Ryan v. Attorney
General,"' wherein it was recognized that the right of bodily integrity is
one of the "personal rights" in article 40 of the Constitution.", This right
is alleged to protect the right to life of the unborn. The right of bodily
integrity implies that
no mutilation of the body or any of its members may be carried out on any
citizen under the authority of the law except for the good of the whole body
and no process which is, or may, as a matter of probability be, dangerous or
harmful to the life or health of the citizen or any of them may be imposed
by the Oireachtas."12
This dictum is alleged to rule out the possibility of a law liberalizing
abortion in Ireland on other than therapeutic grounds. This contention,
however, is very doubtful, for the fetus is never mentioned as such; it is
only where the mother's body or any member of her body is "mutilated"
that action becomes ultra vires, and the fetus is not part of the mother's
body, much less a member of her body. The second passage, on first read-
ing more appropriate, is in McGee v. Attorney General."' It is dictum from
Judge Walsh's opinion in the Supreme Court: "[Alny action on the part
of either husband or wife or of the state to limit family sizes by endangering
or destroying human life must necessarily not only be an offence against
the common good but also against the guaranteed personal rights of that
human life.""' 4 This extract is extremely important. It is clear that accord-
ing to Judge Walsh an unborn child has "guaranteed personal
rights"-guaranteed, this must mean, by the Constitution. Judge Walsh
does not refer, and it is a significant omission, to guaranteed personal
rights of that human life which are dependent on live birth.
According to the traditional theory of common law, there are no guar-
anteed or guaranteeable rights unless one is a person, born alive, severed
from one's mother and capable of sustaining a writ of habeas corpus."' The
Succession Act gives inheritance rights to a child en ventre sa mere who is
not illegitimate and who is subsequently born alive."' The Civil Liability
107 Id.
log Id. § 1.
' Id. § 4.2.
[1965] I.R. 294 (High Ct. 1963).
Id. at 313.
"' Id. at 313-14 (Kenny, J.).
[1974] I.R. 284 (Sup. Ct. 1972). See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
11, [1974] I.R. at 312.
See generally W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
"e Succession Act, No. 27 of 1965, § 3 (2).
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Act also contains a proviso relating to live birth."7 It is submitted that such
a proviso is no longer justifiable. In most cases the import of the proviso is
that it is cheaper to kill early rather than late. It is understandable that
the proviso was necessary when it was medically and scientifically difficult
to prove causation of injury. Nowadays, however, this justification does not
exist. It is illogical to maintain that a stillborn child is not capable a priori
of being regarded as a person for the purpose of imposing the contemplated
liability. Possibly one might assume that Judge Walsh intended to signify
by his omission that the proviso of live birth does not apply to constitu-
tional claims-that an unborn person is more than merely a potential
person under the Irish Constitution.
The complexity surrounding the meaning of "born alive" is not the
least reason for abandoning the proviso. It simply augments the case for
abolition of the distinction."" If the proviso of live birth were abolished, a
claim that a legislative ban on abortion violated a woman's constitutional
right of privacy would be difficult to sustain when weighed against a claim
based on the personal right to life of a fetus. One clearly would be talking
about human life, not potential human life.
CONCLUSION
Abortion concerns an area of morality which is private as well as
public, and where judge and legislator alike play important roles. At pres-
ent the Law Reform Commission set up under the Law Reform Commis-
sion Act of 1975 is considering reform of family law. In the view of the
present writer, the commission should consider the right to life in this
context. Article 4(1) of the American Convention of Human Rights de-
clares that the state will protect the right to life "and in general, from the
moment of conception." In all post World War II documents embodying
human rights provisions, the right to life is treated in a separate article. It
is clearly appropriate that protection of the right to life be declared in a
way that is commensurate with the importance of that right for the entire
community.
"1 See text accompanying note 84 supra.
"' Most people seem unaware of this distinction. The Irish Hierarchy seems to lack aware-
ness, as the following extract from Part I of the Pastoral on Human Life in 1975 indicates:
It is contradictory of Parliament to remove the right to life of the unborn child by
passing an Abortion Act, and at the same time defend the child as a legal entity who
may inherit if his father dies before he is born, and who may sue for damages if he
suffers injury from drugs or trauma, such as a motor accident, during pregnancy.
